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Food safety, food fraud and food defense: a fast evolving literature 1 
 2 
Abstract 3 
 4 
Intentional food crime is plural in nature in terms of the types of crime and the differing levels 5 
of financial gain. Successful models of food crime are dependent on how well the crime has 6 
been executed and at what point, or even if, detection actually occurs. The aim of this paper is 7 
to undertake a literature review and critique the often contradictory definitions that can be found 8 
in the literature in order to compare and contrast existing food crime risk assessment (FCRA) 9 
tools and their application. Food safety, food defense, and food fraud risk assessments consider 10 
different criteria in order to determine the degree of situational risk for each criteria and the 11 
measures that need to be implemented to mitigate that risk. Further research is required to 12 
support the development of global countermeasures that are of value in reducing overall risk 13 
even when the potential hazards may be largely unknown and specific countermeasures that 14 
can act against unique risks. 15 
Keywords: adulteration; fraud; holistic; risk mitigation 16 
Abbreviations: economically motivated adulteration (EMA); Food Crime Risk Assessment 17 
Model (FCRA) 18 
1. Introduction 19 
Contamination in the context of food can be described as “the introduction or occurrence of an 20 
unwanted organism, taint or substance to packaging, food, or the food environment” (BRC, 21 
2015). Food safety hazards have been defined as “a biological, chemical, or physical agent in, 22 
or condition of, food with the potential to cause an adverse health effect” (CAC, 2003; BS EN 23 
ISO 22000; 2005; Wallace et al. 2011). The United States (US) Federal Food, Drug and 24 
Cosmetic Act Section 342 defines adulterated food principally as food that bears or contains: 25 
“any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health; but in case 26 
the substance is not an added substance such food shall not be considered adulterated under 27 
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this clause if the quantity of such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it injurious 28 
to health.” Thus an adulterant can be deemed to be any poisonous or deleterious substance. 29 
Section 343 of the same legislation defines misbranded food as food that is falsely or 30 
misleadingly labeled, offered for sale under another name, is an imitation of another food, 31 
where a container is misleading as to the contents.  The term adulterated food as described 32 
above does not distinguish explicitly between intentional or unintentional addition of an 33 
adulterant. Lipp (2011) stated that to differentiate between the terms contamination and 34 
adulteration, and by inference contaminant and adulterant, the former should be considered in 35 
terms of unintentional activity and being technically unavoidable, whilst adulteration is 36 
intentional replacement of an ingredient that is specifically motivated e.g. for economic or 37 
ideological gain. 38 
It should be considered that although the terms contamination and malicious contamination 39 
have been used widely in the literature, some US literature distinguishes between contamination 40 
and adulteration in that the former is used to describe instances of unintentional contamination 41 
whilst the latter term is used to define all intentional activities whether motivated for economic 42 
gain (EMA) or not. In this paper if literature is quoted that has described an event as 43 
contamination, whereas the US definition would define it as adulteration, for purposes of 44 
accuracy to the original source that term has remained in the text. However, consideration 45 
should be given going forward when developing supply chain standards and regulations to 46 
ensure common terminology use as this would be of value. 47 
Whilst historically food safety was described as the concept that food will not cause harm to 48 
the consumer when it is prepared and/or eaten according to its intended use (BS EN ISO 22000, 49 
2005) i.e. a term encompassing both (a) intentional acts and (b) unintentional contamination, 50 
more recent literature seeks to differentiate between the two. PAS 96 (2014) defines a hazard 51 
as something that can cause loss or harm which arises from a naturally occurring or accidental 52 
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event or results from incompetence or ignorance of the people involved compared to a threat 53 
being something that can cause loss or harm which arises from the ill-intent of people.  FSIS 54 
(2014) characterizes food safety and food defense as being distinct issues that need to be 55 
addressed namely that food safety refers to protecting the food supply from unintentional 56 
contamination whereas food defense refers to protecting the food supply from intentional 57 
adulteration with a motive to cause harm. Alternatively the Global Food Safety Initiative (GSFI, 58 
2013) suggests that food defense is a sub-set of food safety issues (where the adulterant 59 
has the potential to cause harm and separate where the agent is non-harmful rather than the 60 
FSIS definition of them being a separate set of issues.  61 
The potential for food crime is often influenced by a difference between availability and 62 
demand creating an opportunity for criminals or fraudsters to financially benefit from the 63 
shortfall. The World Food Summit of 1996 defined food security as existing “when all people 64 
at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life” 65 
(WHO, nd). Defra (2006) goes further and defines levels of food security as: individual or 66 
household food security relating to purchasing power which is determined by income, access 67 
to resources, and affordability of food; regional food security where regions are dependent on 68 
key distribution routes for food; national/trading block food security relates to the ability of 69 
a country or trading block to assess sufficient foodstuffs, even in the face of severe disruptions 70 
to the supply chain; and global food security i.e. the ability of the world’s food producers to 71 
meet global demand, and ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of global trading and 72 
distribution systems. The interconnecting factors that frame food security also influence the 73 
opportunities for food crime. 74 
Crime is defined as an offence or illegal acts punishable by law. The term “illegal” can be 75 
considered as being unlawful, contrary to law or an activity which the law directly forbids 76 
(Rapalje and Lawrence, 1997). Food crime can be described as an activity organized by 77 
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individuals or groups who knowingly set out to deceive, and or injure, those purchasing and 78 
consuming food (adapted from Elliott Review, 2014).  This rationale would suggest that food 79 
crime occurs when food is intentionally modified in order to bring harm to individuals or for 80 
purposes of economic gain and both situations may lead to issues of food safety or food quality.  81 
Two brothers who owned and operated Jensen Farms in Colorado pled guilty to charges 82 
associated with the introduction of cantaloupe adulterated with Listeria monocytogenes 83 
rendering the product injurious to health into interstate commerce (FDA, 2013).  Thus it was 84 
determined that the cantaloupe bore a poisonous substance that rendered them injurious to 85 
health. In May of 2011 the Jensen brothers allegedly changed their cantaloupe cleaning system. 86 
The new system, built to clean potatoes, was installed, and was to include a catch pan to which 87 
a chlorine spray could be included to clean the fruit of bacteria. The chlorine spray, however, 88 
was never used. In this example the term adulteration is suggests that by intentionally failing to 89 
implement a process that is specifically designed to minimize the risk of  harm to consumers 90 
then a criminal act has taken place. 91 
Fraud can simply be described as: a type of criminal activity that can be an abuse of position, 92 
or false representation, or prejudicing someone’s rights for personal gain (SFO, nd). Food fraud 93 
is defined by the Food Standards Agency (FSA) as: “deliberately placing food on the market, 94 
for financial gain, with the intention of deceiving the consumer” (Elliott Review, 2014). The 95 
Elliott Review (2014:6) states that “food fraud becomes food crime when it no longer involves 96 
random acts by ‘rogues’ within the food industry but becomes an organised activity by groups 97 
which knowingly set out to deceive, and or injure, those purchasing food” thus building on the 98 
FSA definition.  99 
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determine economically motivated adulteration 100 
(EMA) as “the fraudulent, intentional substitution or addition of a substance in a product for 101 
the purpose of increasing the apparent value of the product or reducing the cost of its 102 
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production”, i.e., for economic gain (Lutter, 2009). EMA is therefore only one example of the 103 
types of fraudulent activity that can occur in the food supply chain and EMA as a definition 104 
should not be used when considering other types of fraudulent activity.  This is discussed more 105 
fully later in the paper. The aim of this research is to undertake a literature review and critique 106 
the often contradictory definitions that can be found in the literature in order to compare and 107 
contrast existing food crime risk assessment (FCRA) tools and their use. The use of the term 108 
FCRA is novel and not currently used in the literature and as such is an evolving concept. Whilst 109 
Elliott (2014) proposed the use of food crime prevention networks FCRA build on this as they 110 
contain two distinct elements as is described in this paper. Firstly there is the risk assessment 111 
process itself and then the development of a series of countermeasures that are embedded in a 112 
food control system at organizational or national levels. Thus adopting Felson’s approach 113 
(2006) of identifying events, sequences and settings is helpful in developing food crime risk 114 
assessment models.   115 
The methodological approach that has been used in terms of critiquing existing academic and 116 
gray literature is of value to academics and practitioners to clarify the current contradictions in 117 
the literature and to develop a common, accepted vocabulary that is then utilized going forward 118 
in the food industry. This element of redefinition will also inform future reviews of regulatory 119 
standards and also global standards such as those developed through Codex Alimentarius and 120 
the International Standards Organization (ISO). 121 
2. Food defense 122 
Food defense is the collective term used to describe activities associated with protecting the 123 
nation's food supply from deliberate or intentional acts of contamination or tampering (FDA, 124 
2014). Food defense therefore encompasses intentional contamination (perhaps better phrased 125 
as adulteration) of the food supply contrasting with the unintentional contamination that is the 126 
focus of established food safety measures (Mitenius et al. 2014). The authors suggest that the 127 
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concept of intentional adulteration as being separate from unintentional contamination 128 
introduces the notion of a different set of vocabulary such as perpetrator, malicious intent and 129 
capabilities.  Further, food defense has been described as the process to ensure the security of 130 
food and drink and their supply chains from all forms of intentional malicious attack including 131 
ideologically motivated attack leading to contamination or supply failure (GFSI, 2013). This 132 
definition suggests that the term food defense is not only used to define national strategy 133 
towards intentional food adulteration, but also can be used at the supply chain and 134 
organizational level. Indeed BRC (2015) considers food defense as the procedures adopted to 135 
assure the safety of raw materials and products from malicious contamination or theft.  136 
Therefore, food defense has been said to reflect the protection activities, and/or the security 137 
assurance process or procedures that deliver product safety with regard to intentional acts of 138 
adulteration. These policies, processes and procedures will be defined in this paper as 139 
countermeasures (see Section 3). Countermeasures are the means and mechanisms 140 
implemented to mitigate risk and as a phrase widely used in criminology literature.  141 
Food defense strategies can therefore be implemented at national and local levels. The FDA 142 
(2015) has differentiated between national risk assessment models and supply chain or 143 
organizational food defense models. At national strategy level, in the US the CARVER+ Shock 144 
method has been adopted where the acronym CARVER stands for: Criticality – a measure of 145 
the public health and economic impacts of an attack as a result of the batch size or network of 146 
distribution; Accessibility – the ability to gain physically access and egress where this can 147 
change over time and also as a result of the use of counter-measures; Recuperability – the 148 
ability of food system to recover from an attack; Vulnerability – the ease of accomplishing the 149 
attack. This too can change over time and as a result of the use of counter-measures; Effect – 150 
the amount of direct loss from an attack as measured by loss in production; Recognizability – 151 
the ease of identifying the target, with Shock a combined measure of the health, psychological, 152 
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and collateral national economic impacts of a successful attack on the target system being the 153 
final element (FDA, nd).  154 
A vulnerability assessment (VA) tool can be developed to operate at the food facility or 155 
individual food process level. The VA tool specifically focuses on three elements that reflect 156 
the vulnerabilities that exist and the means for their mitigation for an organization that could 157 
potentially be under threat namely the attributes: Criticality, Accessibility, and Vulnerability.  158 
This approach is sometimes referred to as Vulnerability Analysis Critical Control Point or 159 
VACCP. The FDA and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) adapted CARVER+ Shock 160 
to also develop a vulnerability assessment software (VAS) tool that can be used at food facility 161 
or process level in order to build a food defense plan (FDA, 2015). The food defense plan 162 
approach supports food business operators to develop personalized food defense plans by 163 
integrating existing FDA tools, guidance, and resources into one single application (FDA, 164 
2015). Therefore a situational and premises focused food defense plan can be established to 165 
address the risk of intentional food adulteration. 166 
Situational risk has been explored within criminology literature (McGloin et al. 2011; Perline 167 
and Goldschmidt 2004). Situational risk factors, are often predictive,  lie outside of the 168 
individual and include environmental factors such as corporate culture, work environment and 169 
can have a multiple compounding impact (Perlite and Goldschmidt, 2004: Carson and Bull, 170 
2003)  and such risk can be reduced by strengthening environmental resilience to mitigate such 171 
risk (Clapton, 2014). Therefore, situational crime prevention seeks to reduce opportunities for 172 
specific categories of crime by increasing the associated risks and difficulties and reducing the 173 
rewards (Clarke, 1995) so situational crime prevention in terms of deterrence of food crime and 174 
reduction of crime risk is an important consideration (Spink and Moyer, 2011).  175 
Crime vulnerability can be defined as the extent to which an individual, organization, supply 176 
chain or national food system is at risk from, or susceptible to, attack, emotional injury or 177 
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physical harm or damage from an intentional act. The WHO (2002) suggested that vulnerability 178 
should be assessed on the basis of the scientific, economic, political and social circumstances 179 
of a country to measure the extent of the threat and to set priorities for resources. The WHO 180 
further note that vulnerability should be assessed as a multidisciplinary activity, with input from 181 
legal, intelligence, medical, scientific, economic and political sectors (Manning et al. 2005). On 182 
a national level vulnerability may be assessed on the basis of a number of factors (Table 1). 183 
Further, the determined level of vulnerability needs to be routinely reassessed to ensure that the 184 
ranking and prioritization of risk remains appropriate and that suitable countermeasure(s) 185 
continue to be in place.  186 
Take in Table 1 187 
 188 
Independently PAS 96 (2014) has been developed as a standard to underpin the Threat Analysis 189 
Critical Control Point (TACCP) approach to assessing the risk associated with such threats. 190 
PAS 96 (2014) describes TACCP as the systematic management of risk through the evaluation 191 
of threats, identification of vulnerabilities, and implementation of controls to materials and 192 
products, purchasing, processes, premises, distribution networks and business systems by a 193 
knowledgeable and trusted team with the authority to implement changes to procedures. 194 
TACCP has been designed to interface with and build upon food safety risk management 195 
methodology such as hazard analysis critical control point (HACCP) as many precautions taken 196 
to assure the safety of food, are likely to also deter or detect deliberate acts of contamination 197 
(PAS 96, 2014). TACCP uses a matrix type approach to identify the likelihood of an incident 198 
occurring and how it might be mitigated through the use of appropriate countermeasures. This 199 
approach is only of value where potential threats and the risk associated with them can be 200 
assessed so it is of little value in mitigating against emerging issues when as previously outlined 201 
the modus operandi is for the crime to continue undetected. 202 
 9 
3. Food fraud and wider food crime 203 
Most food fraud cases are not harmful, but notable exceptions include the melamine in Chinese 204 
skimmed milk powder (Gossner et al. 2009), sudan dyes in spices (Stiborova et al. 2002), false 205 
labeling of puffer fish as monkfish (Cohen et al. 2009) and the plasticizer di (2-ethylhexyl) 206 
phthalate (DEHP) being used as a cheaper substitute of clouding agents in food and beverages 207 
(Yang et al. 2013). Different types of food fraud generate various levels of monetary gains, 208 
dependent on how well the ‘fraud’ has been carried out, and if detection occurs and form an 209 
element of wider food crime.  Spink and Moyer (2011) proposed seven types of food fraud: 210 
namely adulteration, counterfeit product, diversion of products outside of intended markets, 211 
over-run, simulation, tampering and theft (Table 2).  212 
Take in Table 2 213 
 214 
Criminal attributes can also be characterized into ideological, occasional, occupational, 215 
professional and recreational types (Spink et al. 2013). PAS 96 (2014) using a different 216 
approach identifies a number of threats that need to be considered when undertaking TACCP 217 
namely: EMA, malicious contamination, extortion, espionage, counterfeiting and cybercrime 218 
with an associated typology for individuals that pose a threat:  219 
• The extortionist. 220 
• The opportunist. 221 
• The extremist. 222 
• The irrational individual. 223 
• The disgruntled individual. 224 
• The hacktivist and other cyber criminals. 225 
• The professional criminal. 226 
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This extends beyond the product-orientated types of food fraud to consider wider organizational 227 
fraud associated with accounting, organizational “secrets” e.g. recipes, unique processing 228 
standards etc. When seeking to mitigate supply chain fraud assessment activities must consider 229 
countermeasures that are implemented at the supply chain level not just at the facility level. 230 
This parallels with the procurement requirement for the adoption of pre-requisite programs such 231 
as good agricultural practice by suppliers that are designed to prevent food safety issues from 232 
occurring in the first place rather than focusing on activities within a site-HACCP plan for 233 
detection at facility level as the predominant level of control. 234 
Criminology and understanding of behavioral science provides a wider insight into the 235 
motivation and causation behind food crime. This research has considered the extent to which 236 
food fraud and food defense fit into these theoretical criminological frameworks (Table 3). 237 
Table 3 considers six crime motivation theories and shows the difference between traditional 238 
HACCP style risk assessment and the type of assessment that needs to be included in 239 
approaches such as TACCP and VACCP. Using HACCP whilst the cause of a food safety 240 
hazard is considered in terms how the hazard can arise in order to implement an appropriate 241 
preventive measure the mindset of the perpetrator or the incentives to intentionally contaminate 242 
have not been explicitly addressed. Furthermore if there is an argument that food safety, food 243 
fraud and food defense need to be risk assessed separately there is not requirement to include 244 
intentional food adulteration during the HACCP process. Food defense needs to consider the 245 
perpetrator, the relevance of impact and their motivation to cause harm. Food fraud is driven 246 
by singular motivation i.e. the desire for gain and in order to implement appropriate 247 
countermeasures the motivational element of food fraud needs to be fully understood.  248 
Take in Table 3 249 
  250 
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The magnitude of harm caused by intentional adulteration in terms of likelihood and severity 251 
will increase according not only to the agent used, but also if an individual can operate 252 
unnoticed in an organization or operates in collaboration with the organization. The degree of 253 
mitigation achieved by implementing appropriate countermeasures will vary by type of crime 254 
and by the commitment of the management of the organization to minimize vulnerability to 255 
crime (Table 4). Seven types of criminal are outlined in Table 4 from the ideologically 256 
motivated individual to those who see crime as a recreational activity for entertainment and 257 
amusement, occasional criminals that are opportunist and commit crime infrequently, 258 
occupational criminals who are active within their place of employment and professional 259 
criminals who fund their lifestyle completely from criminal activity. The magnitude of risk (in 260 
terms of likelihood and severity) is considered in Table 4 and will be unique to the situation 261 
that arises. Typical countermeasures have been described for different types of criminal that 262 
need to be considered within an effective food control program.  263 
This complexity is shown further in Table 5, and by using a slight modification of the 264 
questioning (5 Whys see Motarjemi and Wallace, 2014) technique of root causes analysis firstly 265 
food fraud and then food defense with regard to both internal employees and external agents 266 
and the risk of intentional food adulteration is considered. The root cause analysis demonstrates 267 
that a proactive approach to improving work and supply chain related practices and that focus 268 
on intentional adulteration i.e. countermeasures and the utilization of FCRA tools to determine 269 
vulnerability is essential in order to mitigate risk.   270 
Take in Tables 4 and 5 271 
 272 
This argument extends as shown in Tables 4 and 5 to the development of measures to mitigate 273 
risk developed as a result of using threat or vulnerability analysis tools. Mitigation measures or 274 
countermeasures are designed not only to lessen the impact, but also to make intentional 275 
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contamination less likely in the first place (Mitenius et al. 2014). Countermeasures developed 276 
to minimize food crime risk can include: the use of unique serial numbers at batch, product or 277 
lot level; traceability through measures such as Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFID), 278 
and features on the packaging of individual items such as special inks, holograms, etc. on cases 279 
of product or on each pallet (Spink et al. 2010). HACCP as a risk assessment tool was developed 280 
initially to consider contamination in its entirety both intentional and unintentional a 281 
differentiation between the terms food safety and food defense would mean that this may have 282 
to be revisited especially in light of an organization using a combination of HACCP, VACCP 283 
and TACCP as risk assessment tools. A HACCP approach considers the development of an 284 
operational pre-requisite program (OPRP). An OPRP is identified within hazard analysis 285 
approaches as essential in order to control the likelihood of introducing food safety hazards 286 
and/or the contamination or proliferation of food safety hazards in the product(s) or in the 287 
processing environment (BS EN ISO 22000: 2005). Further the development of an OPRP 288 
alongside the integration within an organizational management systems of an effective portfolio 289 
of food crime countermeasures is of great importance when considering the degree of risk 290 
associated with both adulteration and unintentional contamination in a given operational 291 
situation.  292 
The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) position paper on mitigating the public health risk of 293 
food fraud (July 2014) considers the interaction of food defense, food fraud, food safety and 294 
food quality. This approach does not clearly separate food safety, food quality, food defense 295 
and food fraud but this may simply be a causal result of using a Venn diagram to pictorially 296 
describe the interaction. This overlapping representation is in contrast to FSIS (2014) and the 297 
FAO Assuring Food Safety and Quality: Guidelines for Strengthening National Food Control 298 
Systems publication (2003:3) that states that: 299 
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“Food safety refers to all those hazards, whether chronic or acute, that may make food 300 
injurious to the health of the consumer. It is not negotiable. Quality includes all other 301 
attributes that influence a product’s value to the consumer”. 302 
The FAO (2003) publication places particular importance on the fact that the clear distinction 303 
between food safety and food quality and this has public policy implications and also 304 
implications for the development of organizational management systems. Thus this separating 305 
of terminology can be extended to the organizational development of food safety, food defense 306 
and food quality plans, and determining their purpose in terms of what factors they are seeking 307 
to control. Therefore the four elements of a food control system, otherwise determined as the 308 
four elements of food protection (see Spink and Moyer, 2011) can be described as follows: 309 
• Food defense – ideologically motivated intentional adulteration that makes the food 310 
injurious to health. 311 
• Food fraud – economically motivated intentional adulteration that may or may not 312 
make the food injurious to health. Thus some food fraud issues may overlap with the 313 
definition of food defense whilst others may be a food quality issue. 314 
• Food safety – unintentional contamination of food that makes the food injurious to 315 
health; and 316 
• Food quality – delivery of attributes that influence a product’s value to consumers.   317 
These definitions have been drawn together visually (Figure 1). This approach differs from  (i) 318 
that of Spink and Moyer (2011) where they identified the four elements described above, as 319 
being distinct i.e. no food fraud overlap between food quality and food safety (see Figure 2) 320 
and (ii) that of GFSI (2014) where all four terms are seen as overlapping.   321 
Take in Figures 1 and 2 322 
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The rationale for determining the four elements food safety, food defense, food fraud and food 323 
quality as highlighted in this research is important when developing either a national or an 324 
organizational food control system.  325 
 326 
4. Approaches to developing independent food crime risk assessment (FCRA) 327 
Increasingly there is a requirement to consider a more holistic approach that encompasses not 328 
only scientific criteria, but also aspects of social science in order to risk assess adulteration.  Six 329 
of the existing FCRA models have been compared (Table 6) in terms of their aims, mechanisms 330 
of operation and practicalities of use. Table 6 highlights the value of each model in different 331 
situations. The ability to actually quantify the likelihood of a threat or vulnerability in a given 332 
situation is in many ways influenced by the degree of adoption of countermeasures and their 333 
effectiveness.  334 
Take in Table 6 335 
The standard BS EN ISO 31000: 2009 – Risk management: principles and guidance provides 336 
principles, framework and a process for managing risk. The standard defines uncertainty (or 337 
lack of certainty) as a state or condition that involves a deficiency of information and leads to 338 
inadequate or incomplete knowledge or understanding. In the context of risk management, 339 
uncertainty exists whenever the knowledge or understanding of an event, consequence, or 340 
likelihood is inadequate or incomplete. Once determined, BS EN ISO 31000: 2009 provides a 341 
hierarchy of how risk should be dealt with: 342 
1. Avoiding the risk by deciding not to start or continue with the activity that gives rise to 343 
the risk; 344 
2. Accepting or increasing the risk in order to pursue an opportunity; 345 
3. Removing the risk source; 346 
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4. Changing the likelihood; 347 
5. Changing the consequences; 348 
6. Sharing the risk with another party or parties (including contracts and risk ﬁnancing); 349 
and 350 
7. Retaining the risk by informed decision. 351 
HACCP too develops a hierarchy for assessing and mitigating food safety risk (CAC, 2003) the 352 
so called seven principles of HACCP: 353 
PRINCIPLE 1 Conduct a hazard analysis.  354 
PRINCIPLE 2 Determine the Critical Control Points (CCPs).  355 
PRINCIPLE 3 Establish critical limit(s).  356 
PRINCIPLE 4 Establish a system to monitor control of the CCP.  357 
PRINCIPLE 5 Establish the corrective action to be taken when monitoring indicates that a 358 
particular CCP is not under control.  359 
PRINCIPLE 6 Establish procedures for verification to confirm that the HACCP system is 360 
working effectively.  361 
PRINCIPLE 7 Establish documentation concerning all procedures and records appropriate to 362 
these principles and their application.  363 
In order to develop a food safety control system CCPs are identified using qualitative, semi-364 
quantitative or quantitative means of assessment. Matrices, scoring systems and decision trees 365 
are commonly used to identify specific CCPs and mechanisms to eliminate or reduce risk to an 366 
acceptable level. The degree of uncertainty is difficult to determine absolutely so semi-367 
quantitative mechanisms are often used. This approach is also favored with TACCP to 368 
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determine threats and vulnerabilities. The TACCP approach considers the following questions 369 
(PAS 96, 2014): 370 
1. Who might want to attack us?  371 
2. How might they do it?  372 
3. Where are we vulnerable?  373 
4. How can we stop them?  374 
The threat assessment uses a similar semi-quantitative matrix approach, but despite the name 375 
CCPs are not identified as TACCP is more of a threat prioritization system based on the 376 
presence or absence of appropriate countermeasures. The Carver+ Shock or CAV approach of 377 
VACCP again uses a semi-quantitative scoring approach through a scoring system without 378 
defining CCPs specifically. Marsh (2015) suggests that VACCP and TACCP must be 379 
undertaken simultaneously so an organization can have a clear picture of both threats and 380 
vulnerabilities. Instead of using CCPs, Marsh (2015) decided to use Vulnerability and Threat 381 
Points (VTP) as a mechanism for prioritizing risk. In another approach, the NSF Fraud 382 
Protection Model can be used to assist organizations to ‘think like a criminal’ – particularly in 383 
assessing vulnerability from the perspective of what is advantageous to the fraudster (NSF, 384 
2015). Hence, the model was based on the assumption that fraudsters tend to target food 385 
products of higher value where the adulteration is difficult to detect. This can be used to create 386 
a hierarchy of low medium and high food fraud risk scenarios (Figure 3).  387 
Take in Figure 3  388 
Five models have been analysed TACCP, VACCP, the food protection risk matrix (Spink and 389 
Moyer, 2011), the food fraud model (NSF, 2014) and the CARVER + Shock Tool (FDA, 2014). 390 
The mechanisms employed are ones of semi-quantitative risk assessment using prioritization 391 
matrices or weighted scoring systems. This approach is often weakened by the degree of 392 
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uncertainty as to the exact nature of the threat and its likelihood of occurrence. This means that 393 
“unknown” threats cannot be mitigated using this approach alone. The most important element 394 
of FCRA is the development of a holistic hierarchy (adapted from BS EN ISO 31000: 2009) of 395 
how risk should be mitigated: 396 
1. Avoiding the risk by ceasing activity or removing the source (only of value with risks 397 
that can be quantified); 398 
2. Avoiding the risk by not commencing the activity (only of value with risks that can be 399 
quantified); 400 
3. Reducing the risk by implementing countermeasures to reduce the likelihood of 401 
occurrence (this approach can address both known and unknown threats where they are 402 
controlled by the same countermeasure); 403 
4. Sharing the risk with another party or parties including contracts, insurance and risk 404 
ﬁnancing - again this of limited value if a threat and its potential impact cannot be 405 
quantified; and 406 
5. Retaining the risk or accepting the level of risk by informed management decision with 407 
the associated monitoring and verification activities. 408 
In many cases there is a requirement at national or organizational level for informed decision 409 
making with regard to degree of risk that is also centered on the balance between cost and 410 
benefit derived which is often difficult to determine in the case of unknown or un-quantified 411 
threat. 412 
5. Conclusion 413 
The aim of this research is to undertake a literature review and critique the definitions that can 414 
be found in the literature in order to compare and contrast existing FCRA models and their 415 
application. Figure 1 has been developed to demonstrate the clear distinction between food 416 
safety, food quality and food defense and the overlapping nature of food fraud incidents 417 
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depending on whether the intentional criminal activity has the potential to cause harm or impact 418 
on product quality. This builds on existing literature by clearly differentiating what is and is not 419 
included in terms of threat, or as in food safety defined as a food safety hazard, i.e. the cause 420 
and then how the effect before and after countermeasures have been implemented is quantified 421 
when undertaking a VACCP, TACCP or HACCP assessment. The challenge is that the 422 
distinction between a potential threat (hazard) and the consequences (effect) should it arise, and 423 
the difference between adulteration and unintentional contamination of food and thus the 424 
associated countermeasures that should be adopted, is not always fully appreciated by 425 
individuals at the facility level who are involved in developing an overarching food 426 
protection/control system. This is an organizational weakness that can then lead to the 427 
implementation of an adequate food protection/control system which is of little value to the 428 
organization in mitigating threat. Intentional food crime is plural in nature in terms of the types 429 
of crime and the differing levels of financial gain. This can also be said in terms of the 430 
multiplicity of definitions of food safety, food defense, food fraud and food quality found in 431 
both academic and gray literature. This plurality creates confusion and multiple interpretations 432 
when FCRA is adopted and implemented. In further iterations of regulations, standards and 433 
industry protocols increasing harmonization will benefit the industry in developing cohesive 434 
food protection/control programs that address all four elements described in this paper and 435 
clearly differentiate between contamination and adulteration. Successful modes of food crime 436 
are dependent on how well the crime has been carried out and at what point, or even if, detection 437 
actually occurs. BS EN ISO 31000: 2009 provides a hierarchy of how risk should be dealt with 438 
including avoiding, accepting or retaining risk. Appropriate countermeasures should be adopted 439 
as a result of the use of an FCRA model and reassessment to either remove the risk source; 440 
change the likelihood of the risk or the consequences should it occur, sharing or spreading the 441 
risk or retaining but monitoring the risk on an ongoing basis. Further research is therefore 442 
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required to support the development of global countermeasures over and above the critique in 443 
Table 4. A framework of countermeasures that are developed in consort with FCRA activities 444 
is of value to any organization as has been demonstrated with the development of OPRP to 445 
address potential hazards and mitigate food safety risk at facility and supply chain levels. 446 
 447 
6. References 448 
 449 
BRC (2015), British Retail Consortium Global Standard Food Safety. Issue 7.  BRC, London. 450 
 451 
BS EN ISO 22000:2005, Food Safety management systems – Requirements for any 452 
organization in the food chain, BSI London. 453 
 454 
BS ISO 31000, Risk management – Principles and guidelines BSI London 455 
 456 
CAC (Codex Alimentarius Commission) (2003), Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 457 
(HACCP) System and Guidelines for its application, Codex Alimentarius Commission Food 458 
Hygiene Basic Texts (Revision 4). Available at: http://www.codexalimentarius.org [Accessed 459 
on: 15the October 2015] 460 
 461 
Carson, S. and Bull, R. (2003), Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts, John Wiley & 462 
Sons. 463 
 464 
Clapton, W. (2014), Risk and Hierarchy in International Society: Liberal Interventions in the 465 
Post-Cold War Era. Palsgrave Macmillan 466 
 467 
Clarke, R.V. (1995), Situational Crime Prevention, Crime and Justice Vol. 19, Building a 468 
Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention (1995), pp. 91-150 469 
 470 
Cohen, N. J., Deeds, J. R., Wong, E. S., Hanner, R. H., Yancy, H. F., White, K. D., 471 
Thompson, T. M., Wahl, M., Pham, T. D., Guichard, F. M., Huh, I., Austin, C., Dizikes, G. 472 
and Gerber, S. I. (2009). Public health response to puffer fish (Tetrodotoxin) poisoning from 473 
mislabeled product, Journal of Food Protection 72(4): 810-817 474 
 475 
Cohen, L. and Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: a routine activity 476 
approach. American Sociological Review 44(4): 588-608. 477 
 478 
Croall, H. (2009). White collar crime, consumers and victimization, Crime, Law and Social 479 
Change, 51: 127-146  480 
 481 
Defra (2006) Food Security and the UK: An Evidence and Analysis Paper. Food Chain 482 
Analysis Group. Defra. December 2006 483 
 484 
Elliott Review (2014), Elliott Review into the Integrity and Assurance of Food Supply 485 
Networks – Final Report A National Food Crime Prevention Framework. HM Government 486 
July 2014. London. 487 
 20 
 488 
FAO (2003), Assuring food safety and quality: Guidelines for strengthening national control 489 
systems. FAO Food and Nutrition Paper 76. ISBN 0254-4725 490 
 491 
FDA (2015) Vulnerability Assessment Software. Available at: 492 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodDefense/ToolsEducationalMaterials/ucm295900.htm#whatme493 
an [Accessed on: 15/10/15] 494 
 495 
FDA, (2014), US Food and Drug Administration, Food Defense Acronyms, Abbreviations & 496 
Definitions, Available at: 497 
http://www.fda.gov/food/fooddefense/toolseducationalmaterials/ucm296330.htm [Date 498 
accessed 07 October 2015] 499 
 500 
FDA (2013) Eric and Ryan Jensen Plead Guilty to all Counts of Introducing Tainted 501 
Cantaloupe into Interstate Commerce Available at: 502 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm373174.htm [Date accessed 04 503 
January 2016] 504 
 505 
FDA (nd) Vulnerability Assessments of Food Systems Final Summary Report June 2009 – 506 
February 2012 Available at: 507 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodDefense/UCM317547.pdf [Accessed on: 15/10/15] 508 
 509 
US Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Section 342 Available at: 510 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/pdf/uscode21/lii_usc_TI_21_CH_9_SC_IV_SE_342.pdf 511 
[Accessed 28.12.15] 512 
 513 
US Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Section 342 Available at: 514 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/pdf/uscode21/lii_usc_TI_21_CH_9_SC_IV_SE_343.  515 
[Accessed 28.12.15] 516 
 517 
Felson, M. (2006), The ecosystem for organized crime, Heuni paper No 26.    518 
FSIS (2014), FSIS Food Safety and Food Defense - Information for In-Commerce Firms, 519 
May 2014 USDA Available at:   520 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/86cc4d8e-c963-4be2-936a-745e2da9063a/food-521 
defense-incommerce-firms.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [Accessed on: 15/10/15] 522 
 523 
GFSI (2014), GFSI Position on mitigating the public health risk of food fraud. July 2014. 524 
Available at: http://www.mygfsi.com/news-resources/news/295-gfsi-position-paper-on-525 
mitigating-the-public-health-risk-of-food-fraud.html [Accessed on: 15/10/15] 526 
 527 
GFSI (2013), The Global Food Safety Initiative GFSI Guidance Document. Version 6.3. 528 
October 2013  529 
 530 
Gossner, C.M., Schlundt, J., Embarek, P.B., Hird, S., Lo-Do-Wong, D., Beltran J.J.O., Teoh, 531 
K.N., and Tritscher, A., (2009)  The Melamine Incident: Implications for International Food 532 
and Feed Safety Environ, Health Perspect. 2009 December; 117(12): 1803–1808. 533 
 534 
 21 
Hirschauer, N. and Zwoll, S. (2008). Understanding and managing behavioural risks: the case 535 
of malpractice in poultry production. European Journal of Law and Economics 26: 27-60 536 
  537 
Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press. 538 
 539 
Leathers, R. (2014). Guideline no. 72. TACCP Threat assessment and critical control point: A 540 
practical guide. Chipping Campden: Campden BRI, pp. 1-96. 541 
 542 
Lipp, M. (2011), A closer look at chemical contamination. Available at: 543 
http://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/magazine-archive1/augustseptember-2011/a-closer-544 
look-at-chemical-contamination/ Accessed on 28th December 2015 545 
 546 
Lutter, R (2009), Addressing challenges of economically motivated adulteration. Available 547 
from: www.fda.gov/downloads/newsevents/meetingsconferencesworkshops/ucm163631.ppt 548 
Accessed on 28th December 2015 549 
 550 
Manning L., Baines, R.N. and Chadd, S.A. (2005), Deliberate contamination of the food 551 
supply chain, British Food Journal, 107 (4) 225-245.   552 
 553 
Marsh, K. (2015). BRC Newsletter 10. TACCP and VACCP demystified! Available from: 554 
http://www.techni-k.co.uk/Newsletter_10 Date accessed 24 September 2015 555 
 556 
McGloin, J.M., Sullivan, C.J., and Kennedy, L.W., (2011), When Crime Appears: The role of 557 
emergence. Routledge 558 
 559 
Mitenius, N., Kennedy, S.P. and Busta, F.F. (2014), Chapter 35 – Food Defense, Food safety 560 
management: A Practical Guide for the Food Industry, (2014), 937-958. 561 
 562 
Motarjemi, Y. and Wallace, C. A. (2014). Food safety assurance systems:  Root cause analysis 563 
of incidents. In, Y. Motarjemi (Ed.).  Encyclopedia of Food Safety Vol. 4 Food Safety 564 
Management. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 331-339.   565 
 566 
NSF Safety and Quality UK Ltd. (2014). Risk modelling of food fraud motivation – “NSF 567 
Fraud Protection Model” intelligent risk model scoping project. FS 246004. Available from: 568 
https://www.food.gov.uk/sites/default/files/NSF%20Final%20report.pdf Date accessed 7 569 
October 2015. 570 
 571 
PAS 96 (2014), Guide to protecting and defending food and drink from deliberate attack. BSI 572 
London 573 
 574 
Pease, K. (2006). Rational choice theory. In, McLaughlin, E. and Muncie, J. (eds.). The Sage 575 
Dictionary of Criminology. London: Sage. 576 
 577 
Perline, I.H and Goldschmidt, J. (2004), The Psychology and Law of Workplace Violence: A 578 
Handbook for Mental Health Professionals and Employers, Charles C Thomas Publisher 579 
 580 
Rapalje, S., and Lawrence, R.L. (1997), A Dictionary of American and English Law, The 581 
Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 582 
 583 
 22 
SFO (nd) What is fraud? Available at: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/fraud/what-is-fraud.aspx 584 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/fraud/what-is-fraud.aspx  Date accessed at 28th November 2015 585 
 586 
Spink, J., Moyer, D.C, Park, H. and Heinonen, J.A (2013), Defining the types of 587 
counterfeiters, counterfeiting and offender organizations, Crime Science, 2:8 588 
 589 
Spink, J. and Moyer, DC. (2013), Understanding and Combating Food Fraud, Food 590 
Technology, 67(1): 30-35. 591 
 592 
Spink, J. and Moyer, D. C. (2011). Defining the public health threat of food fraud. Journal of 593 
Food Science 76(9): 157-163 594 
 595 
Spink, J., Helferich, O.K., and Griggs, J.E. (2010). Combating the Impact of Product 596 
Counterfeiting. Distribution Business Management Journal 10(1), 6. 597 
 598 
Stiborová, M., Martínek, V., Rýdlová, H., Hodek, P. and Frei, E. (2002). Sudan I is a potential 599 
carcinogen for humans. Evidence for its metabolic activation and detoxication by human 600 
recombinant cytochrome P450 1A1 and liver microsomes 1. Cancer Research, 62: 5678-5684. 601 
 602 
USP (nd) Appendix XVII: Guidance on Food Fraud Mitigation Available at: 603 
http://www.usp.org/sites/default/files/usp_pdf/EN/fcc/Notices/guidance_on_food_fraud_miti604 
gation.pdf [Accessed on 4th January 2016] 605 
 606 
WHO (2002), Food Safety Issues: Terrorist Threats to Food: Guidance for Establishing and 607 
Strengthening Prevention and Response Systems 2002. ISBN 9241545844 608 
 609 
WHO (nd), Food Security, Available at: http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028/en/ 610 
[Accessed on 4th January 2016] 611 
 612 
Walklate, S. (2007). Understanding criminology. Buckingham: Open University Press. 613 
 614 
Wallace, C.A., Sperber, W.H., and Mortimore, S.E., (2011), Managing HACCP and Food 615 
Safety Through the Global Supply Chain. Wiley Blackwell ISBN 9781405189118 616 
 617 
Yang, J., Hauser, R. and Goldman, R. H. (2013). Taiwan food scandal: the illegal use of 618 
phthalates as a clouding agent and their contribution to maternal exposure. Food and Chemical 619 
Toxicology 58: 362-368. 620 
 621 
  622 
 23 
 623 
Table 1. Factors that can be used to assess national food system vulnerability (Source: 624 
Manning et al. 2005) 625 
 626 
Factors that can be used to assess national food system vulnerability 
• The effectiveness of the countries food safety management infrastructure and current 
surveillance mechanisms; 
• Availability of potential food contamination agents; 
• Motivation for perpetrators of food terrorism; 
• Potential for the agent to contaminate mass produced food and gain widespread distribution; 
• Potential of human-to-human transmission of the agent; 
• Capability for an effective emergency response and; 
• Potential size of the threat to the food supply chain, animal health and welfare, export food 
trade, tourism and public health. 
 627 
Table 2. Types of food crime (Adapted from BRC, 20151; Spink and Moyer, 20132 and 628 
Croall, 20093) 629 
Type2 Definition1 Definition2 Definition3 
Adulteration The addition of an 
undeclared 
material into a 
food item for 
economic gain. 
A component of the finished 
product is fraudulent 
Product adulteration 
Counterfeit  All aspects of the fraudulent 
product and packaging are fully 
replicated 
 
Diversion  The sale or distribution of 
legitimate products outside of 
intended markets 
 
Over-run  Legitimate product is made in 
excess of production agreements 
 
Simulation  Illegitimate product is designed 
to look like but does not exactly 
copy the legitimate product 
 
Tampering  Legitimate product and 
packaging are used in a 
fraudulent way 
 
Theft  Legitimate product is stolen and 
passed off as legitimately 
procured 
 
Malicious 
poisoning, 
bioterrorism 
or  sabotage 
 Intentional adulteration with a 
view to cause harm, fear or dread 
using other types of food crime 
identified by Spink and Moyer 
(2013). 
Food poisoning 
Misleading 
indications 
(words/ 
pictures)2 
  Use of words such as “natural”, 
“traditional”. Use of pictures e.g. 
depictions on packaging that do 
not reflect the nature of the 
product inside or the methods of 
production 
Packaging 
size2 
  Use of overlarge packaging 
 630 
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Table 3. Motivation behind food fraud and food defense activities  
Types of 
food crime 
Rational Choice 
Theory (Pease, 2006) 
Routine Activity 
Approach (Cohen 
and Felson, 1979) 
Social Control Theory (Hirschi, 1969) Relative 
Deprivation 
(Walklate, 
2007) 
Game-theoretic approach 
(Hirschauer and Zwoll 
2008) 
Common sense 
(Walklate 2007) 
Food fraud Perpetrator weighs the 
costs and benefits of 
committing a crime and 
makes his or her choice. 
In this context, choice is 
governed by time, 
ability and access to 
relevant information.  
Economic incentive as 
pull factor 
Offenders decided 
to commit crime 
according to a 
particular time, 
targeted victims and 
place. Categorized 
into a triangular 
relation – a 
motivated offender, 
potential victim and 
the presence or 
absence of a 
guardian. It is 
important in this 
scenario for the 
offender to be 
aware of the 
victim’s routine 
Bound by fear of consequences. Social 
controls exerted by four types of bonds. 
Attachment level of strength or weakness 
of relationships between an individual 
and others as via relationships. The 
stronger the social expectation, the 
stronger the attachment, the more likely 
the individual will conform. Commitment 
i.e. conformity to a particular lifestyle. 
The higher the level of commitment, the 
less likely the individual will deviate 
from it. Involvement - the time spent in 
conventional behavior or law abiding 
practices. The longer the time spent in 
engaging in these activities, the less time 
the individuals will have for other things. 
The final bond explains that if an 
individual had been brought up with the 
belief that they are law abiding citizens, 
the less likely they are to break the law. 
Occurs when an 
individual feels 
deprived or 
perceive 
themselves as 
deprived. The 
sense of 
deprivation is 
commonly (but 
not exclusively) 
connected to 
material 
circumstances 
Material 
circumstances. 
Economics / 
incentives as 
pull factor 
Reconstructs the monetary 
incentives of profit-oriented 
actors. The likelihood for 
these economic actors to 
break rules increase with the 
probability of profits they 
expect to earn and reduces if 
losses are anticipated due to 
risk of detection. At the same 
time, fraud activities will 
decrease with an increase in 
social factors that could 
‘protect’ or ‘shield’ the profit-
oriented actors from yielding 
to the economic temptation.  
Estimates the incentives of 
actors in farm or food 
industries. Helps to identify 
or expose critical settings 
where economic temptations 
may arise. 
Food fraud is driven by 
monetary needs or gains 
and / or greed.   
Food defense Time, ability and 
information. Motivation 
to do harm. 
Motivated offender 
with a clear 
potential victim. 
No fear of consequences. Impact oriented. Impact oriented. Sadist, enjoy thrill of 
‘excitement’ caused by 
the harm, revenge, envy. 
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Table 4. Criminal types and attributes, risk and typical countermeasures (Adapted from Spink et al. 2013) 
 
Types of Criminals Definition Magnitude of risk 
(Likelihood/Severity) 
Typical countermeasures and controls in the food supply chain to 
mitigate risk 
Ideological poisoning- (usually 
single motive group or 
individual) 
Domestic or international terrorist who 
commits the criminal act to make an 
ideological statement or to economically 
harm an entity, or to create panic and fear 
in the target population. 
Magnitude will depend on the nature of 
the product, organization, supply chain 
and/or the population targeted.  
Currently the use of risk assessment by organizations to identify 
appropriate controls e.g. security, tamper evidence, supplier assurance 
Recreational tampering and or 
theft. 
Undertakes crime for entertainment or 
amusement 
Low risk potentially mitigated by 
implementing appropriate 
countermeasures. 
Traditional technical risk assessment to implement supply chain and onsite 
security e.g. enclosed containers, secure vehicles and containers, tamper 
evident seals etc. 
Occasional diversion, 
tampering or theft 
Infrequent, opportunistic individual Low risk potentially mitigated by 
implementing appropriate 
countermeasures. 
Traditional technical risk assessment to implement supply chain and onsite 
security e.g. enclosed containers, secure vehicles and containers, tamper 
evident seals etc. 
Occasional over-run Infrequent, opportunistic individual Low risk potentially mitigated by 
implementing appropriate 
countermeasures. 
Stock control measures and mass balance exercises to ensure that resources 
utilized equate to product sold legitimately on invoices, dispatch notes etc. 
Occasional adulteration 
(substitution) e.g. product with 
different provenance or method 
of production i.e. conventional 
product sold as organic, 
different ingredients etc. 
Infrequent, opportunistic individual Low risk potentially mitigated by 
implementing appropriate 
countermeasures. 
This activity would be reactive and not systemic within the organization or 
the food supply network. Controls will be different depending on whether 
perpetrators are inside or outside the business and whether there is internal 
pressure to substitute to meet supply chain requirements e.g. order size. 
Measures such as stock control, mass balance exercises, internal audits, 
CCTV cameras may identify but risk level increases especially if 
adulteration cannot be identified readily by laboratory or visual analysis. 
Occupational Crime occurs at the place of employment, 
either as an individual acting alone or in 
collaboration with the modus operandi of 
the organization 
Magnitude of risk increases especially 
if individual can operate unnoticed in 
an organization or operates in 
collaboration with the organization. 
Potentially a degree of mitigation by 
implementing appropriate 
countermeasures unless the activity is 
deliberately ignored or encouraged by 
management. 
Crime occurs at the place of employment, either lone individuals or 
through collaboration with the modus operandi of the organization. 
Perpetrators understand the controls and countermeasures in place and are 
able to work around them falsifying documentation if necessary 
Professional Criminal activity fully finances their 
lifestyle 
Magnitude of risk increases and will 
depend on the nature of the product, 
organization, supply chain and/or the 
population targeted. 
Existing measures and controls in place can be vulnerable to professional 
criminals and their networks 
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Table 5. Root cause analysis of intentional food adulteration (Adapted from Motarjemi and Wallace, 2014). 
 
 Food fraud Food Defense (internal employee) Food Defense (external agent) 
1 Why was the fraud committed? Why did the employee deliberately adulterate the 
product? 
Why did the agent deliberately adulterate the 
product? 
 Motivated for monetary gain. Deliberately modifying 
the food to achieve more $ 
Motivated to harm or insinuate harm had been caused. Motivated to harm, publicity, other motive 
2 Why did the agent want monetary gain? Why did the employee want to bring harm? Why did the agent want to bring harm? 
 Motivation to access money especially if perpetrator 
can identify a vulnerability 
Revenge, dissatisfaction,  excitement in causing chaos, 
financial gain e.g. blackmail,  
Revenge, dissatisfaction, envy (competitor), excitement 
in causing chaos, financial gain e.g. blackmail 
3 Why did the agent target this organization? Why did the employee feel dissatisfy or resentful? Why did the agent target this organization? 
 Ability to perpetrate the crime without discovery, 
magnitude of financial gain compared to risk. 
Unjust work-related practices, termination, personal grudge Unjust business-related practices, personal grudge, ability 
to gain publicity due to organization’s profile. 
4 Why did illicit business related practices arise? 
What is it about the organization’s profile that 
draws attention? 
Why was the employee terminated? Why did unjust 
work-related practices arise in the company? 
Why did unjust business-related practices arise with 
the company? What is it about the organization’s 
profile that draws attention? 
 In order to answer the above specific questions, the 
respective organization can investigate reasons e.g. 
vulnerability to fraud, networks in which the business 
operates etc. 
In order to answer the above specific questions, the 
respective organization can investigate if the above claims 
are true and find ways to resolve unjust work-related 
practices.  
In order to answer the above specific questions, the 
respective organization can investigate reasons e.g. 
country of origin of organization, religious or ideological 
background, previous business practice that could warrant 
organization being seen as unjust. 
5 How should the company react? How should the company react? How should the company react? 
 Investigate the incident and identify vulnerabilities 
through the use of an appropriate analysis tool 
Change of keys /access number to reduce accessibility, 
security and utilization of threat analysis tool  
Change of keys /access number to reduce accessibility, 
security and utilization of CARVER + Shock tool 
6 How proactive should the company be to reduce 
future risk of threats 
How proactive should the company be to reduce future 
internal food threats? 
How proactive should the company be to reduce future 
external food threats? 
 Adopt proactive approach to improve work related 
practices and conditions and utilization of appropriate 
analysis tool. 
Adopt proactive approach to improve work related practices 
and conditions and utilization of threat analysis tool. 
Adopt proactive approach to improve work and supply 
chain related practices and conditions and utilization of 
threat analysis tool. 
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Table 6. Comparison of existing FCRA models   
 Threat Assessment 
Critical Control Point 
(TACCP) 
Vulnerability 
Assessment and 
Critical Control 
Point (VACCP) 
Food Protection Risk Matrix 
(Spink and Moyer 2011) 
NSF Fraud 
Protection Model 
(NSF, 2014) 
USP Preventive Food 
Fraud Management 
System (USP, nd) 
CARVER + Shock Tool (US FDA) 
Aims To assess threats and  
prevent behaviorally or 
ideologically motivated 
intentional adulteration   
(Leathers 2014)  
To assess how 
exposed/ 
susceptible 
organization or 
premise is to food 
fraud incidents.  
Prevention of  
intentional EMA 
(Spink 2014) 
To differentiate food fraud 
among other food control 
elements such as food safety, 
food defense and food quality.  
To better anticipate 
the likelihood of 
fraudulent attack on 
food products 
especially according 
to product value. 
To assist users in how to 
develop and implement a 
preventive system 
specifically for the 
adulteration of food 
ingredients. 
Allows user to think like an attacker and to determine the most 
vulnerable point within a system or premise to an attack. 
To focus resources on protecting the most susceptible points in 
the system. 
Mechanisms Qualitative assessments 
(likelihood x impact) of 
threats 
Qualitative 
assessments 
(likelihood x 
impact) of threats 
Risk matrix is designed to 
identify the cause of risk and 
the motivations driving the 
fraud but not the effect. 
Built on a 4 
quadrant Boston 
Consulting Group 
(BCG) matrix. 
-Top right = 
products most 
attractive to 
fraudster 
-Bottom left = least 
attractive to 
fraudster 
-Size of circle of a 
food product 
represents the 
perceived difficulty 
of conducting the 
fraud.   
Structured approach to 
characterize food fraud 
vulnerabilities with 
associated guidance to 
develop mitigation 
strategies. 
 
Nine contributing factors 
considered and how they 
impact on vulnerability 
using a matrix approach. 
 
Lifecycle approach 
proposed for food fraud 
management. 
Based on seven attributes which are scored on a scale of 1-10 
(FDA 2014) 
• Criticality - measure of public health and economic 
impacts of an attack 
• Accessibility – ability to physically access and egress from 
target 
• Recuperability – ability of system to recover from an 
attack 
• Vulnerability – ease of accomplishing attack 
• Effect – amount of direct loss from an attack as measured 
by loss in production 
• Recognizability – ease of identifying target 
• Shock – combined health, economic, and psychological 
impacts of an attack. 
Provides relative risk rankings for nodes / process steps in a 
production process or national food system. 
Practicalities Likelihood and impact 
scores and use of priority 
matrix in TACCP 
provides hierarchy for 
action by risk for 
organizations. 
Assess threats within 
manufacturing 
environment or within an 
organization but will be 
difficult to assess 
suppliers i.e. prior to 
delivery  (Marsh 2015) 
Can be used in the 
wider supply 
chain. 
The four quadrants in the 
matrix assist in exploring 
criteria 
Food quality – may be caused 
by mishandling 
Food safety – may be caused 
by unintentional contamination 
Food fraud – intentionally 
done to increase profit margin 
Food defense – deliberately 
carried out to cause harm 
(Spink and Moyer, 2011) 
Food industries and 
regulatory teams can 
use the model to 
anticipate which 
products are most 
likely to be targeted 
by fraudsters, the 
factors for targeting 
and whether 
previous frauds had 
occurred.  
Four step process. First 
three characterize fraud 
vulnerabilities associated 
with an ingredient by 
considering occurrence 
and impact. Last step is 
guidance. 
Critical or vulnerable nodes / process steps are identified based 
on the scores. 
Prioritize mitigation measures and resources to reduce 
likelihood of attack. 
 
Another option in CARVER + Shock would be to only use the 
Criticality, Accessibility and Vulnerability (CAV) scores and 
facility or process line level. 
Suggestions / 
Extensions  
To assess both threats and vulnerabilities and 
combined under one system. Combine threat 
and vulnerability assessment and manage risk 
under one management system. 
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Figure 1. Intentional and unintentional modifications of food (food fraud, defense, safety 
and quality) that need to be addressed in a food control system. (Adapted from GFSI, 
2014; FSIS, 2014; Leathers, 2014; Spink and Moyer, 2011) 
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Figure 2. The food protection risk matrix (Adapted from Spink and Moyer, 2011) 
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Figure 3. Food fraud quadrant model (Adapted from NSF, 2015) 
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